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Article 1, Anglo-Irish Treaty:
Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in the Community of 
Nations known as the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada, the 
Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the 
Union of South Africa, with a Parliament having powers to make laws 
for the peace, order and good government of Ireland, and an Executive 
responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as the 
Irish Free State.
The constitutional status granted by the Treaty went far beyond the 
arrangement which had been provided for in the Government of Ireland 
Act, 1920, which was essentially a home rule arrangement. However, it 
was less than the status of a republic, which the Irish side had originally 
sought. It was also somewhat less than the idea of ‘external association’, 
which was formulated subsequently by Éamon de Valera, who believed the 
new Irish state could be sovereign and separate from the Commonwealth 
while still ‘associated’ with it. Although external association would have 
provided the appearance of a more separate state (and therefore the hope 
was a more sovereign state), essentially the major difference between this 
position and the position of the Free State was, in reality, symbolic. 
Dominion status itself was a vague concept in 1921. In practice, this 
effectively meant internal autonomy, despite the relics and symbols of 
colonial subordination which persisted. There was confusion over the 
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exact powers of the governor general, in particular the question as to 
whether the United Kingdom government could exercise any control 
through this position in relation to the assent to legislation. While 
the dominions had virtually full control over domestic matters, their 
external powers were unclear. They did not have the power to legislate 
with extra-territorial effect and they had only begun to establish a power 
to make treaties (something which the Irish Free State already had a 
head start on). The key here was that the Treaty recognised dominion 
‘usage’ and ‘practice’ and not just the (often obsolete) law. That division 
between what is practised and what is ‘law’ is still a feature of the 
British system today and can be seen, in particular, in relation to powers 
which are theoretically held and exercisable by the monarch but are, 
in fact, exercised by the prime minister or the government. It was well 
recognised at the time that dominion ‘practice’ went beyond the limits 
of the law and it was a big step to grant to Ireland the same usage and, 
therefore, the same level of autonomy that the dominions had secured 
for themselves in practice.1 Also, as the dominions went on to carve out 
new areas of autonomy for themselves these would apply to the fledgling 
dominion as well.
Leo Kohn has aptly described the constitutional status of the new 
state as follows: 
In substance this implied full internal self-government, unrestricted 
fiscal autonomy, the right to maintain an Irish Police Force and an 
Irish Army subject only to the control of the Irish Parliament. In the 
sphere of external relations, it involved the concession of the new 
international status of the British Dominions, the right to enter into 
agreements with foreign States, freedom from obligations arising 
from treaties not specifically approved by the Irish Parliament, full 
discretion in the matter of Irish participation in British wars, and, 
lastly, membership of the League of Nations. In form it connoted the 
conclusive recognition of Irish internal sovereignty.2
The words ‘Community of Nations known as the British Empire’ are 
used here, whereas the words ‘group of nations forming the British 
Commonwealth of Nations’ is used in Article 4. There is no difference 
between the two and it is unclear why two different formulae would be 
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used in the same document but the word ‘Commonwealth’ had only just 
begun to be used to describe the dominions.
The name Saorstát Éireann, which was translated as ‘Irish Free State’, 
is an assertion of the sovereignty of the state. The appellation was the 
official title which was given to the state at the first session of Dáil Éireann 
in 1919 and then also in the Treaty. While literally translated it means 
‘free state of Ireland’, its broader meaning is that of an Irish republic. 
There was no established direct translation into Irish of the word republic 
besides the word saorstát but the word poblacht had been created as a 
Gaelicisation of the word. Rather than base the name of the state on 
a foreign loan word, it was evidently decided, in 1919, to use a ‘truer’ 
Irish term. The word poblacht was used in the 1916 proclamation but the 
Declaration of Independence and the other documents from 1919 had all 
favoured saorstát. The word saorstát, the ‘alternative neologism based on 
purer Gaelic roots’, was also used on official headed paper, including that 
which was used by de Valera in 1921 in order to provide credentials for 
the plenipotentiaries who negotiated the Treaty.3
In Peace by ordeal, Frank Pakenham refers to a ‘fragment of dialogue’ 
between Arthur Griffith and Max Aitken, Lord Birkenhead, during 
the Treaty negotiations, where Griffith commented: ‘You may prefer 
to translate “Saorstát Éireann” by “Free State” (instead of republic). We 
shall not quarrel with your translation.’4 Birkenhead answered: ‘The title, 
Free State, can go into the Treaty.’5 It is unclear whether the British truly 
understood the connotations of the Irish word. This may have felt like 
a secret coup to the Irish but, particularly with the passage of time, it 
seems the true connotations of the title have been forgotten in Ireland. 
Indeed, the name ‘Free State’ or ‘Free Stater’ later became a derogatory 
term directed towards ‘partitionists’. 
The name of the state is something which caused confusion for a 
number of decades following this and still many Irish people are confused 
about the official name of the state. In 1937, when the new Constitution 
was promulgated, the Irish Free State was still legally in existence and, 
because of the External Relations Act of 1936, Ireland was still within 
the Commonwealth. A decision was taken to rename the state: Éire, or 
Ireland (but not Republic of Ireland). There are a number of probable 
reasons for the avoidance of the word republic at this time: firstly, Ireland 
was still partitioned and it may have been felt in some quarters that the 
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declaration of a republic without having achieved a united Ireland would 
be a betrayal of the Easter Rising of 1916; the use of the word might 
also have angered unionists in the North and the state, supporters of 
dominion status in Ireland, and the British. Also, at the time, declaring 
a republic would have meant leaving the Commonwealth and it suited 
Ireland, for economic reasons, to remain within this entity. However, 
de facto independence had already been achieved with the passing by 
the British parliament of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, which gave 
autonomy to the dominions, and in 1945, in response to a question in 
the Dáil about the status of the state, Taoiseach Éamon de Valera replied, 
with what became known as his ‘Dictionary Republic’ speech, that Ireland 
was a republic in everything but name. In fact, it was not until 1949 that 
Ireland officially became a republic with the passing of The Republic of 
Ireland Act, 1948, which provided a legislative basis for the description of 
the state as a republic. However, the Constitution remains unchanged and 
the name of the state remains Éire or Ireland.6
Article 2:
Subject to the provisions hereinafter set out the position of the Irish 
Free State in relation to the Imperial Parliament and Government and 
otherwise shall be that of the Dominion of Canada, and the law, practice 
and constitutional usage governing the relationship of the Crown or 
the representative of the Crown and of the Imperial Parliament to the 
Dominion of Canada shall govern their relationship to the Irish Free 
State.
During the Treaty negotiations, Lord Birkenhead suggested Canada as 
a model for the Irish Free State but this was not the first time Canada 
had been mentioned as a model for Ireland. In 1886, when framing his 
home rule bill, Prime Minister W.E. Gladstone took inspiration from the 
colonies and decided that his bill was ‘strictly and substantially analogous’ 
to the Canadian constitution.7 Erskine Childers, in Framework for home 
rule, also argued for a development along Canadian lines.8 At the time 
of the negotiations, the Irish were unsure whether they would obtain the 
same level of autonomy which the dominions had secured for themselves 
in practice and, presumably, the insertion of the guarantee that the 
relationship between the Irish Free State and Britain would be identical to 
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that of Canada and Britain was designed to reassure the Irish.9 As noted 
above, the specification of dominion usage and practice in the Treaty 
was crucial. For example, in Canada this meant unrestricted legislative 
autonomy since the royal legislative power had not been used for such a 
long period in Canada that it had generally been agreed to be extinct.10 
In writing about the choice of linking the Irish Free State to Canada in 
particular, Hugh Kennedy, who was the Irish state’s first attorney general, 
explained that: 
The reason was that during the period of more than fifty years 
which had elapsed since Canada as a group of British Colonies had 
received her constitution by the enactment of the British North 
America Act, 1867, Canada had outgrown her colonial status as 
well as her constitution, and in the gradual evolution of law practice 
and constitutional usage had reached national stature and exhibited 
marks of national sovereignty. Canada is, in fact, the great example 
to-day of the truth of the statement that no man can set bounds to 
the onward march of a nation, even by a written constitution.11
On the Irish side, there was a feeling that because constitutional usage 
had been secured, this would allow the new Irish state to avoid the strict 
dominion forms and law. On the British side, it was felt that linking 
the Irish Free State to Canada would mean that dominion forms would 
have to be followed to a certain extent. For example, there seems to have 
been a presumption that the royal prerogatives of appointing ministers, 
summoning and dissolving parliament etc would be maintained in the 
Irish Free State. However, the subsequent Irish Free State Constitution 
completely ignored the royal prerogatives and thus the Irish hope that 
the use of Canada would enable Ireland to gain further autonomy was 
gradually borne out.
As far as Kennedy was concerned, the link with Canada was crucial 
to securing autonomy within the agreed framework: ‘The fact thus 
appears that Canada provided the key to the problem for solution by the 
parties to the negotiations, the problem, namely, how the association of 
Ireland with the Community of Nations known as the British Empire 
might best be reconciled with Irish National aspirations.’12 Two things, 
in particular, impressed Kennedy about Canadian practice – the right to 
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separate diplomatic representation which had been asserted by Canada 
for some years and the right which had been asserted by Canada to have 
a controlling voice in the selection of the representative of the Crown.
One issue which Kennedy questioned, however, was whether an issue 
would later arise through case-law on whether Canadian usage would 
have to be ascertained to decide points of Irish law: ‘This may possibly 
give rise to legal questions in the future throwing upon our Courts the 
burden of ascertaining from authoritative Canadian sources Canadian 
law practice or constitutional usage for the purpose of deciding such 
questions.’13 But it seems this never happened. 
Article 3:
The representative of the Crown in Ireland shall be appointed in like 
manner as the Governor-General of Canada and in accordance with 
the practice observed in the making of such appointments.
Interestingly, the title of governor general is not insisted upon in the 
Treaty. During the negotiations, the Irish successfully argued for the 
absence of a title in the Treaty itself and it was agreed that this would be 
settled later when the Constitution was drafted.
Drafts A and B of the 1922 Irish Free State Constitution both contain 
a short identical section containing one article on external relations. This 
article provides, among other things, that the representative of George V 
will ‘be styled Commissioner of the British Commonwealth, and shall be 
appointed only with the previous assent of the Aireacht [Executive Council] 
of Saorstát Éireann’.14 It was specified that he would sign acts which have 
been passed by the Oireachtas ‘to signify the assent of His Majesty the 
King’.15 Historically, high commissioners were envoys of the Imperial 
government appointed to manage protectorates or groups of territories 
not fully under the sovereignty of the British Crown, for example Cyprus. 
Evidently, the Irish wished to distance themselves further from the Crown 
colonies, which were administered by a governor general, in order to show 
that the Irish Free State was a sovereign state in itself. Presumably, the name 
‘commissioner’ rather than governor general was supposed to play down 
the possible significance of this figure. However, when the Constitution 
was brought to London in May 1922, the British refused to agree to this 
and the title governor general went into the constitution.
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This article of the Treaty states that the Irish figure should be 
appointed in the same manner as the governor general of Canada. This 
meant that the appointment would be made by consultation between 
both governments. However, the practices which developed around the 
governor general in the Irish Free State differed considerably from that of 
Canada and many of the formalities were dispensed with. For example, 
the governor general of the Irish Free State was never greeted with a gun 
salute; secondly, after a couple of half-hearted efforts, the practice of 
the opening of parliament adhered to in the dominions was suspended; 
thirdly, the Cabinet was not regarded as responsible if the governor general 
spoke out on a public issue as it would be in Canada; finally, even the 
practice in relation to the sending of despatches to London differed.16 As 
one writer has put it: ‘One is therefore led to the conclusion that the office 
of the Governor-General of the Irish Free State, due essentially to the fact 
that the Free State was an entity sui generis in the Commonwealth, was in 
practice rather a ceremonial Presidency of a Republic than a Governor-
General of a real Dominion.’17
Article 4:
The oath to be taken by Members of the Parliament of the Irish Free 
State shall be in the following form:—
I ________ do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the 
Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established and that I 
will be faithful to H.M. King George V., his heirs and successors by law, 
in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and 
her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the 
British Commonwealth of Nations.
This is the controversial oath, which provided that Irish members of 
parliament swore true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the 
Irish Free State and fidelity to the king. As was later continuously 
repeated by members of the Irish government both during the Treaty 
discussions and the Constitution debates, this was not the ‘full-blooded’ 
oath which members in other dominions had to swear. The general 
Commonwealth oath was: ‘I AB do swear that I will be faithful and 
bear true allegiance to His Majesty King X’, with the words ‘So help me 
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God’ sometimes added on at the end. The Irish oath had to be sworn 
to the Irish Constitution and faithfulness is all that was required for 
the king. In comparison, the dominion oath provided that members 
of parliament would swear true allegiance to the Crown. It seems that 
allegiance to the Crown was a much more serious matter than simply 
swearing to be faithful.18
Ironically, de Valera’s alternative to the Treaty, ‘Document No. 2’ 
(which set out his ‘external association’ proposition), originally contained 
a surprisingly similar oath: ‘I do swear to bear true faith and allegiance 
to the Constitution of Ireland and to the Treaty of Association of Ireland 
with the British Commonwealth of Nations, and to recognise the King of 
Great Britain as head of the Associated States’.19 However, recognition of 
the king was not as significant as swearing faithfulness.
In the end, this was the article of the Treaty which was most 
problematic. It was not until de Valera broke with Sinn Féin and founded 
a new republican party (Fianna Fáil) that most anti-Treaty republicans 
reluctantly subscribed to the oath and took their seats in the Free State 
Dáil in 1927. 
Article 5:
The Irish Free State shall assume liability for the service of the Public 
Debt of the United Kingdom as existing at the date hereof and 
towards the payment of war pensions as existing at that date in such 
proportion as may be fair and equitable, having regard to any just 
claims on the part of Ireland by way of set off or counter-claim, the 
amount of such sums being determined in default of agreement by the 
arbitration of one or more independent persons being citizens of the 
British Empire.
This rather vague article required the Irish Free State to pay a ‘fair and 
equitable’ share of the UK’s public debt and war pensions. However, a 
major difficulty later arose in relation to the lack of precision in this 
provision and the failure to define what exactly constituted the ‘Public 
Debt’. It is another provision which also originally formed part of de 
Valera’s alternative to the Treaty. His slightly different version provides, 
rather sensibly, that if the sums are not agreed then they would be subject 
to independent arbitration:
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That Ireland shall assume liability for such share of the present public 
debt of Great Britain and Ireland and of the payment of war pensions 
as existing at this date as may be fair and equitable, having regard 
to any just claims on the part of Ireland by way of set off or counter 
claim, the amount of such sums being determined, in default of 
agreement, by the arbitration of one or more independent persons 
being citizens of Ireland or of the British Commonwealth.20
During the negotiations on the Treaty, it seems the Irish side was content 
not to settle the detail of the financial liability but it is clear that the Irish 
delegation wished for an independent tribunal to be set up to decide on 
the sum owed.21
Once the dust had settled after the Civil War in Ireland, the arguments 
began about the state’s liability under this provision. The Irish argued that 
they should be compensated by the British for over-taxation in the past, 
as well as for destroyed industries and the millions of emigrants lost to the 
state over the years. A memorandum written by the secretary of the Irish 
Department of Finance, Joseph Brennan, in 1925 on this issue contains 
various arguments for the reduction of the figures sought by the British 
and comes to the conclusion that due to the amount of over-taxation in 
the past, nothing now should be owed.22
An interim arrangement was reached in February 1923, referred to 
as the Hills/Cosgrave pact.23 It included British funding of and guarantees 
for land purchase (from the Anglo-Irish landlord class) and the Irish 
Free State agreed to pay the land annuities (the monies loaned by the 
British government to the tenant farmer class to purchase the land, which 
amounted to about £3 million per annum at the time). The deal was done 
in secret, however, and was never ratified by the Dáil. The question of the 
liability for the land annuities was a difficult one as it was not specifically 
mentioned in the Treaty and it was unclear if it should be regarded as 
‘Public Debt’ under Article 5 or whether it was simply a separate legal 
debt.
A more favourable financial settlement was eventually negotiated 
in 1926 after the Boundary Commission report. In December 1925, as 
part of an agreement signed in London, the Irish Free State was released 
from its obligations under Article 5 but, in return, assumed liability for 
malicious damage done since 1919. A final settlement was then reached 
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in 1926, which determined the remaining financial issues. However, the 
question of the land annuities remained unsettled and while the Irish 
agreed in 1926 that these would be paid in full, further agitation on the 
issue meant that, by 1932, de Valera refused to pay, thus sparking the 
Economic War (1932–1938) between Ireland and Britain. This eventually 
came to an end with the Anglo-Irish Agreement which provided for a 
one-off payment of £10 million for the remaining annuities and also saw 
the return of the Treaty ports (see below).24 
Article 6:
Until an arrangement has been made between the British and Irish 
Governments whereby the Irish Free State undertakes her own coastal 
defence, the defence by sea of Great Britain and Ireland shall be 
undertaken by His Majesty’s Imperial Forces. But this shall not prevent 
the construction or maintenance by the Government of the Irish Free 
State of such vessels as are necessary for the protection of the Revenue 
or the Fisheries.
The foregoing provisions of this Article shall be reviewed at a Conference 
of Representatives of the British and Irish Governments to be held at 
the expiration of five years from the date hereof with a view to the 
undertaking by Ireland of a share in her own coastal defence.
This article can be read in conjunction with the following article, the effect 
of which was to protect Britain from any threats which might occur due 
to a sudden withdrawal of coastal defences. While the Irish side resisted 
this provision, arguing that an invasion of Ireland was unlikely and that 
no naval defence was required, British fears prevailed.
Notwithstanding limitations imposed on the Free State’s ability 
to engage in coastal defence activities, Britain supplied twelve armed 
trawlers to the Free State’s coastal patrol service; as Eunan O’Halpin 
notes, to ‘prevent gun-running’ and to make sea transport available for 
army units.25 O’Halpin further comments that while this development 
represented ‘a clear contravention of article 6 of the Treaty’, the limitations 
attaching thereto were circumvented by the British.26 This was achieved 
by classifying the vessels given by the British as ‘revenue vessels’, which 
were permissible under Article 6 of the Treaty.27 However, the quid pro 
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quo, in this regard, was that such vessels ‘should not be used against 
foreign ships outside British or Irish territorial waters’. 28
The article was removed along with Article 7 in 1938 during the 
Anglo-Irish negotiations in London.
Article 7:
The Government of the Irish Free State shall afford to His Majesty’s 
Imperial Forces:—
(a) In time of peace such harbour and other facilities as are indicated in 
the Annex hereto, or such other facilities as may from time to time 
be agreed between the British Government and the Government of 
the Irish Free State; and
(b) In time of war or of strained relations with a Foreign Power such 
harbour and other facilities as the British Government may require 
for the purpose of such defence as aforesaid.
This article was designed to address a vital British national interest as well 
as a significant, and understandable, British fear: that Irish independence 
would pose a threat to British security. The effect of the article was to 
ensure that an independent Ireland would not be free to conduct an entirely 
independent Irish defence policy. The background to this article was the 
traditional Irish revolutionary practice of entering into alliances with the 
enemies of Britain: Spain under Philip II, Napoleonic France, or Germany 
under the kaiser. The effect of Article 7 was to ensure Britain’s security 
against the danger that hostile foreign powers might attempt to use Ireland 
as a base from which to launch an attack on her.The military clause in 
Article 7 attracted little attention during the debates on the Treaty. This 
might seem surprising, in view of the demands imposed on the Free State 
by the article in general and by the second part of the article in particular. 
The first part provided for the retention by Britain of three bases at 
Berehaven and Queenstown (Cobh), County Cork, and Lough Swilly, 
County Donegal, but the second part had a far wider potential significance 
for the future of the Free State and its population: ‘The Government of the 
Free State shall afford to His Majesty’s Imperial Forces in time of war or of 
strained relations with a foreign power such harbour and other facilities 
as the British Government may require for the purposes of such defence.’ 
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If this clause were to take effect, it would make it impossible for the Free 
State to avoid becoming involved in Britain’s wars, irrespective of the 
wishes of the population. There was no limit to the facilities the British 
government might demand, not merely in wartime, but even at a time 
of ‘strained relations’ unilaterally defined by Britain. The British would 
decide, while the Free State would have no say in how its territory would 
be used, as the clause makes clear: ‘The Government of the Free State shall 
[our emphasis] afford to his Majesty’s Imperial Forces …’ 
One explanation of the fact that this menacing clause in Article 7 
attracted little or no hostile attention when the Treaty was being discussed 
in the Dáil is that it was difficult, if not impossible, for deputies to imagine 
Britain becoming involved in an international crisis or strained relations 
with a foreign power, given the circumstances prevailing in December 
1921 and January 1922 when Britain had recently emerged triumphant 
from a world war and an economic slump had overtaken Europe.
The abolition of Articles 6 and 7 was brought about during the Anglo-
Irish negotiations in London in 1938. The most significant outcome of 
these negotiations was the British agreement to evacuate the three naval 
bases retained by Britain under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. 
Taoiseach Éamon de Valera, who led the Irish delegation, was then free 
to put into practice his policy of neutrality during the Second World 
War. As Ronan Fanning points out, the key element of this policy was 
that ‘Ireland would be free to pursue an independent foreign policy … 
insofar as that policy did not represent a threat to Britain’s vital strategic 
interests.’29 A benevolent neutrality involving considerable logistical 
assistance to Britain was as far as de Valera was prepared to put into 
practice his theory of Anglo-Irish interdependence. Having induced the 
British side to abandon Article 7 of the Treaty, he ensured that the Irish 
state would not be involved involuntarily in Britain’s wars. 
Article 8:
With a view to securing the observance of the principle of international 
limitation of armaments, if the Government of the Irish Free State 
establishes and maintains a military defence force, the establishments 
thereof shall not exceed in size such proportion of the military 
establishments maintained in Great Britain as that which the population 
of Ireland bears to the population of Great Britain.
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John P. Duggan comments that the ability of the new state ‘to raise its 
own defence force was conceded as a necessary condition of the signing 
of the Treaty itself ’ and further observes that this right was not conceded 
in the home rule acts of 1914 or 1920.30 O’Halpin emphasises that in the 
aftermath of the signing of the Treaty, Britain’s initial concern ‘was not to 
restrict the size of the provisional government’s army but to strengthen 
it’, owing to concerns that the anti-Treaty IRA would be able to defeat 
Provisional Government forces in the event of armed confrontation.31 
To prevent this, Britain was content to make available all weapons and 
supplies which the Provisional Government requested to engage in its 
campaign against the anti-Treaty IRA.32 At the start of hostilities in June 
1922, with the outbreak of the Civil War, Provisional Government forces 
comprised ‘about 10,000 men under arms’. 33
Notwithstanding the reality that observance by the Provisional 
Government of the terms of Article 8 were not zealously enforced by 
the British, the economic cost and related financial burdens of the Civil 
War forced the Free State government to undertake a drastic reduction in 
army numbers following the Civil War. These numbers had quadrupled 
to 60,000 ‘between the autumn of 1922 and April 1923’, which J.J. Lee 
refers to as ‘a major administrative feat’.34 However, when the process 
of demobilisation commenced, the category referred to as ‘other ranks’ 
was reduced to 32,821 by 17 November 1923 and this figure was further 
reduced to 13,306 by 31 March 1924.35 The officer class was cut by 1,000 
in December 1923 and a further 1,000 in March 1924, with others having 
their rank reduced.36 By November 1925, the number of army personnel 
in all ranks was 17,439.37 
Article 9:
The ports of Great Britain and the Irish Free State shall be freely open 
to the ships of the other country on payment of the customary port and 
other dues.
This article was also included in de Valera’s alternative to the Treaty and 
it places on a legal footing the presumption in international law that ships 
may enter ports of foreign jurisdictions on certain conditions. The Irish 
side recognised the need for coastal harmony between the two countries 
and there was no opposition to this article.
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It appears the concern was mainly to prevent any restriction on 
trade as an earlier version of the provision read as follows: ‘Neither Great 
Britain nor the Irish Free State shall impose restrictions for protective 
purposes upon the flow of transport, trade and commerce between Great 
Britain and Ireland.’38
Article 10:
The Government of the Irish Free State agrees to pay fair compensation 
on terms not less favourable than those accorded by the Act of 1920 to 
judges, officials, members of Police Forces and other Public Servants 
who are discharged by it or who retire in consequence of the change of 
government effected in pursuance hereof.
Provided that this agreement shall not apply to members of the 
Auxiliary Police Force or to persons recruited in Great Britain for the 
Royal Irish Constabulary during the two years next preceding the date 
hereof. The British Government will assume responsibility for such 
compensation or pensions as may be payable to any of these excepted 
persons.
This seemingly innocuous provision was the subject of considerable 
litigation in the years following the acceptance of the Treaty. The 
provision was elaborated on in the Irish Free State Constitution in Article 
78 which provided that: ‘Every such existing officer who was transferred 
from the British Government by virtue of any transfer of services to the 
Provisional Government shall be entitled to the benefit of Article 10 of 
the Scheduled Treaty’. Article 76 also included judges within the remit of 
the Treaty provision.
The cases which arose were all concerned with the amount of 
compensation payable to the British civil servants who had transferred 
back to Britain from Ireland or who had retired upon the creation of the 
new state, but they became important in relation to the bigger questions 
around the state’s relationship with the appeal to the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council. The appeal was not something which had been 
included in the Treaty and during the negotiations on the Constitution, it 
was vehemently resisted by the Irish side, which expressed fears in relation 
to the possibility of former Ulster unionist leader Sir Edward Carson 
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and his allies sitting in judgment on Irish cases.39 In particular, Griffith 
pointed to the fact that the Judicial Committee comprised persons who 
had used their positions for ‘party political purposes hostile to the Irish 
people’.40 This, he noted, had ‘aroused keen indignation and antipathy 
to the Tribunal of which they are members’.41 In addition, he observed 
that the great volume of Irish litigation was concerned with ‘very small 
money interests’ and thus the appeal would be ‘a rich man’s appeal which 
may be used to the destruction of a man not well off ’.42 He stated that 
he did not think the insertion of the appeal to the Privy Council in the 
Constitution was a necessary incident of the Treaty position. However, 
the British insisted that the appeal would have to apply to the Irish Free 
State as it did in the other dominions but reassured the Irish that the 
practice would be akin to that in South Africa, where a limited appeal 
was in place, and also by encouraging Irish hopes that the appeal would 
soon be abolished.43 Thus the appeal was inserted into Article 66 of the 
Irish Free State Constitution, providing that ‘nothing in this Constitution 
shall impair the right of any person to petition His Majesty for special 
leave to appeal from the Supreme Court to His Majesty in Council or the 
right of His Majesty to grant such leave’.
There had been a series of cases on the issue of compensation but the 
most significant case was that of Wigg and Cochrane v Attorney-General in 
1927.44 The case involved an interpretation by the Supreme Court of Article 
10 of the Treaty, on the issue of the amount of compensation payable to 
the British civil servants who had transferred back to Britain from Ireland 
or who had retired upon the creation of the new state and also on Article 
78 of the Constitution. Two questions had to be considered: whether 
these provisions guaranteed a personal right or whether this was non-
justiciable as a treaty obligation between international actors; and also, 
was this personal right a right to a minimum amount of remuneration, or 
was it simply a guarantee to have remuneration calculated in the manner 
guaranteed under the Government of Ireland Act? In both the High Court 
and the Supreme Court, it was decided that Article 78 of the Constitution 
guaranteed a personal right but the courts differed on the nature of the 
right. Mr Justice James Meredith’s decision in the High Court essentially 
meant that since a constitutional right was at issue, the pensions were not 
a gift of the minister for finance but rather were enforceable and would be 
determined in the courts. The government appealed this to the Supreme 
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Court, where the judgment was more nuanced. While Mr Justice Charles 
O’Connor confirmed the right in Article 78, he also clarified that it was 
‘not a right to any particular sum or sums of money, or to have these 
moneys calculated in any particular way, but a right to the benefit of an 
agreement by the Irish Free State on terms not less favourable than those 
accorded by the Act of 1920’.45 He held that the right was ‘to be treated in a 
like manner as a Civil Servant under the British scheme of Government’.46 
In his view, ‘it was not intended by the Treaty to give Civil Servants 
rights of  action for the recovery of compensation. The creation of such 
rights would completely alter their status as servants of the Crown.’47 This 
effectively reversed the High Court’s decision and meant that the minister 
for finance had the authority to determine the pension amounts. However, 
there was strong dissent from Mr Justice William Johnston who felt that 
the case was broadly about the constitutionally guaranteed rights flowing 
from Article 10 of the Treaty and, in his view, if the government was to 
be allowed to disregard this aspect of the Treaty then it undermined the 
whole agreement. The case was appealed to the Privy Council where the 
decision of the Supreme Court was reversed. 
Martin Maguire explains the effect of the judgment well:
This judgement sent shock waves through the governments in Dublin 
and in London. Under the British administration civil servants were 
by law employed ‘at the pleasure of His Majesty’ and status and 
pensions were by gift rather than by right. It was also the British view 
that the Irish Free State was not the creation of revolution but was a 
devolved government, created by Westminster legislation, continuous 
with the former administration. The Privy Council decision implied 
that the Irish Free State was in fact a break with the former British 
administration. Far more seriously, from a financial point of view, 
the decision also meant there was now a group of civil servants 
within the British and Irish system whose status and security were 
far superior to their colleagues’ and were in fact under-pinned by 
constitutional guarantees.48
However, following the controversial result, it emerged that a mistake of 
fact had occurred and the Judicial Committee was forced to rehear the 
case. The mistake was the actual date upon which the civil servants had 
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been transferred. Nevertheless, the committee upheld its original decision 
but the Irish government refused to accept this decision. Moreover, 
even members of the House of Lords (in its legislative capacity) spoke 
out against the decision of the Privy Council.49 In the eyes of the Irish 
government, this was a betrayal of the position which had been originally 
promised to it since it was led to believe that the appeal would not be 
of great consequence and that judges who were seen as partisan, such 
as George, Lord Cave, who gave the judgment, would not sit on Irish 
appeals. The case had become much more than a dispute over pensions. 
The result on the narrow issue of compensation was unfavourable to 
both the British and Irish governments and so they decided to come to 
an agreement on the matter of compensation to be paid and essentially 
to by-pass the judgment of the Privy Council. Both parliaments passed 
acts which, in effect, revised Article 10 of the Treaty – the Civil Servants 
(Transferred Officers) Compensation Act, 1929 (Ireland) and the Irish 
Free State (Confirmation of Agreement) Act, 1929 (Britain), which 
granted the more favourable terms to civil servants with the British 
government agreeing to pay the difference.50
The case also had much wider consequences in terms of increasing 
the calls for the abolition of the appeal to the Privy Council. The Irish 
argued that the case had demonstrated an anti-Irish bias on the part 
of the court and the matter was repeatedly raised during the Imperial 
conferences. In 1931, the Statute of Westminster was passed which, in 
repealing the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865, gave full legislative 
autonomy to the dominions, and so in 1933 the appeal was unilaterally 
abolished by the Irish government as part of de Valera’s campaign to 
dismantle the Treaty.51 
Article 11:
Until the expiration of one month from the passing of the Act of 
Parliament for the ratification of this instrument, the powers of the 
Parliament and the government of the Irish Free State shall not be 
exercisable as respects Northern Ireland and the provisions of the 
Government of Ireland Act, 1920, shall, so far as they relate to Northern 
Ireland, remain of full force and effect, and no election shall be held for 
the return of members to serve in the Parliament of the Irish Free State 
for constituencies in Northern Ireland, unless a resolution is passed by 
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both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland in favour of the 
holding of such elections before the end of the said month.
Under this article, the terms of the Treaty were deemed to apply to the 
entire island, notwithstanding the provisions of the Government of Ireland 
Act, 1920. In this regard, a scheme of home rule within the Free State 
was being proposed, but David Fitzpatrick observes that ‘loyalist interests 
were protected by the opt-out clause’ which provided that in the event of 
the Northern parliament addressing the monarch ‘within a month of the 
Treaty’s ratification, its powers were to be perpetuated’, with the limitation 
that such powers could be circumscribed by either the convening of the 
Council of Ireland or the establishment of a boundary commission, both 
captured by Article 12.52 When an address before the Northern Ireland 
parliament in December 1922 petitioned King George V to allow it to opt 
out of the jurisdiction of the Free State, Article 12, which was represented 
as a penalty clause upon Northern Ireland, was triggered.53 Article 12 was 
abrogated by the 1925 Tripartite Agreement (see below), which made the 
1920 partition permanent. 
Article 12:
If before the expiration of the said month an address is presented to His 
Majesty by both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland to that 
effect, the powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free 
State shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland, and the provisions 
of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, (including those relating to 
the Council of Ireland) shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, 
continue to be of full force and effect, and this instrument shall have 
effect subject to the necessary modifications.
Provided that if such an address is so presented a Commission 
consisting of three persons, one to be appointed by the Government 
of the Irish Free State, one to be appointed by the Government of 
Northern Ireland and one, who shall be Chairman, to be appointed by 
the British Government shall determine in accordance with the wishes 
of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and 
geographic conditions, the boundaries between Northern Ireland and 
the rest of Ireland, and for the purposes of the Government of Ireland 
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Act, 1920, and of this instrument, the boundary of Northern Ireland 
shall be such as may be determined by such Commission.
The idea of a boundary commission to adjust the frontier between 
Northern Ireland and the Free State originated in a proposal put forward 
by Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Thomas Jones, principal 
assistant secretary to the British Cabinet, to Arthur Griffith, the leader 
of the Irish delegation, on 9 November 1921. At this point, the chances 
of concluding a Treaty appeared remote. The proposal was put to Griffith 
in the absence of the other Irish negotiators and was outlined in a 
document drawn up by Lloyd George and Jones. The document made 
provision for what would happen if Northern Ireland refused to accept 
the principle of a parliament for all-Ireland. In that case, it would be 
necessary to revise the boundary, and a commission set up to do this 
‘would be directed to adjust the line both by inclusion and exclusion so 
as to make the boundary conform as closely as possible to the wishes 
of the population’.54 Griffith assented to this proposal because he was 
led to believe that the commission outlined in the document would be 
likely to settle the Ulster Question permanently in favour of the Free 
State. He told de Valera that the commission arrangement would give 
‘most of Tyrone and Fermanagh, and part of Armagh, Derry and Down, 
etc’ to the Free State.55 When the British side presented a draft treaty to 
the Irish negotiators on 16 November 1921, the boundary commission 
envisaged in this would ‘determine in accordance with the wishes of the 
inhabitants the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of 
Ireland’. This benign version of the role of the boundary commission, 
from a Free State point of view, was part of a clever strategy devised by 
Lloyd George and Jones to entice Griffith and the other Irish negotiators 
to sign the Treaty. 
However, the terms of the boundary commission clause in Article 
12 of the Treaty which Griffith and the other negotiators signed on 6 
December 1921 differed radically from those envisaged in the versions 
Griffith had been shown. The chairman of the three-person commission 
provided for in the Treaty was to be appointed by the British government, 
and the boundary was to be determined in accordance with the 
wishes of the inhabitants, but such wishes had to be ‘compatible with 
economic and geographic conditions’. Thus, a process which originally 
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seemed straightforward was now open to an unpredictable variety of 
interpretations and made to depend in the final analysis on the character 
and outlook of a chairman appointed by one of the two contesting parties. 
As de Valera remarked in a letter to Frank Pakenham in 1963, the trap in 
the Treaty version of the boundary clause – the qualifying phrase ‘so far 
as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions’ – was 
used ultimately to nullify, as a whole, the provision ‘in accordance with 
the wishes of the inhabitants’.56
On his return to Dublin on 3 December 1921 for the final meeting 
between the Treaty delegates and the Dáil cabinet, John O’Byrne, the 
legal adviser to the Irish delegation, warned Griffith that the boundary 
clause did not mean what Griffith thought it did (a major reduction of 
the territory of Northern Ireland), and that it was too vague to admit 
of a single unequivocal interpretation. O’Byrne suggested an alteration 
of the clause which would at least delimit the territorial units to be 
considered in applying it. Pádraic Colum, who recorded this episode as 
a biographer of Griffith, was puzzled that Griffith did not argue for the 
kind of alteration suggested by O’Byrne during the meeting with the Dáil 
cabinet on 3 December. The only explanation that Colum could think of 
was that the meeting was so preoccupied with the oath, the Crown and 
the empire that nobody adverted to the unsatisfactory formulation of the 
boundary clause.57
No representative of the Provisional or Free State administration 
publicly interpreted Article 12 as promising anything less than a radical 
reduction of the area governed by the Northern parliament. Michael 
Collins, for example, assured Bishop Edward Mulhern of Dromore 
that the boundary would be adjusted ‘on the basis of fairness’ and that 
the boundary commission would be obliged to proceed on the basis 
of self-determination principles, and that no doctrine of the Northern 
government could take south and east Down, including Newry, ‘away 
from the Irish Government’.58 The reality of what was going to happen 
when the boundary commission got to work was hinted at by Lloyd 
George ten days following the signature of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. During 
a House of Commons debate on the Treaty on 16 December 1921, Lloyd 
George emphasised that the economic and geographic qualifications 
contained within Article 12 of the Treaty would curtail the boundary 
commission’s latitude in relation to any substantial transfer of territory 
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from Northern Ireland to the Free State.59 This interpretation should 
be understood in the light of the fact that, in 1920, when a parliament 
was established in Belfast, the British government gave guarantees to the 
unionist leadership that the six-county area would remain inviolable. 
Unionist support for the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 was given 
‘on the clear understanding, unanimously sanctioned by Lloyd George’s 
Cabinet, that the Six Counties, as settled after the negotiations [on the 
1920 Act] should be theirs for good and all, and there should be no 
interference with the boundaries’.60 One of Lloyd George’s peculiar talents 
was to deceive both parties to a dispute by encouraging each to believe 
that measures he was introducing to resolve this dispute would benefit 
each of them to the detriment of the other.
Free State leaders who were involved in the Treaty negotiations, for 
example Collins and Griffith, and Ernest Blythe, who was not, persisted 
in maintaining that the boundary clause was weighted in favour of the 
Free State, and that the British government had taken a definite political 
decision to give them two of the six counties, or the greater part of 
three. Blythe foresaw a truncated Northern Ireland consisting of Belfast 
and the rest of County Antrim, the greater part of counties Down, 
Derry and Armagh, and possibly a portion of Tyrone.61 It is difficult to 
reconcile these public stances with the contrary views expressed in the 
British parliament by Lloyd George at the same time. There is evidence 
of a wide gap between the public discourse of Free State ministers and 
their actual views on what a boundary commission would involve. A 
telling example of this can be discerned from the firm assertion by W.T. 
Cosgrave in the Dáil on 20 July 1923, following his appointment of Eoin 
MacNeill as the Free State Boundary Commissioner. Cosgrave declared 
that the Free State government ‘cannot possibly ignore the discontent 
and dissatisfaction of those supporters of the Free State in the North 
who are kept against their will and wish out of the jurisdiction of the 
state to which they do not belong’.62 Here, Cosgrave had in mind the 
entire nationalist majorities of counties Tyrone and Fermanagh as well 
as parts of counties Armagh and Down.63 This contrasts with his talks 
with Northern Prime Minister Sir James Craig on 17 July, only three 
days prior to making his Dáil commitment to border nationalists and to 
uphold their rights as enshrined in Article 12 of the Treaty. On 30 July, 
Craig informed his cabinet that ‘during his interview with Mr. Cosgrave 
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the latter referred personally to the Boundary Commission and stated 
that in view of the coming [Free State] elections it was necessary for him 
[Cosgrave] to have a political cry etc’.64
The boundary clause in Article 12 is the most significant component 
of the Anglo-Irish Treaty for the reason that the Irish delegates would 
not have subscribed to the Treaty unless they had been persuaded by 
their British counterparts that major adjustments to the boundary to the 
benefit of the Free State would follow from the implementation of Article 
12. This point was emphasised by Cosgrave in 1924, at a time when some 
of those who had been signatories to the Treaty on the British side were 
openly proclaiming that the implementation of Article 12 by a boundary 
commission could result in merely minor adjustments to the boundary. 
Cosgrave observed that had the same British signatories amplified such 
opinions during the Treaty negotiations, the Irish plenipotentiaries would 
not have signed the Treaty. Cosgrave was suggesting that the revisionist 
British interpretation of Article 12 was deliberately concealed from the 
Irish side during the negotiations, which implied that the boundary-
commission component of Article 12 was a dishonest device on the part 
of Lloyd George to get the Treaty over the line.65
The Tripartite agreement of december 1925
The leak by the conservative London newspaper, the Morning Post, of 
7 November 1925, of the Boundary Commission’s recommendations, 
caused outrage in the Free State and the nationalist North.66 Impelled 
by this, W.T. Cosgrave sought to limit the damage to his government’s 
position which was threatened by the debacle, particularly by the 
recommendation that parts of east Donegal be ceded to Northern 
Ireland. This contrasted with the expectation that large tracts of the North 
would be ceded to the Free State. Cosgrave persuaded British Prime 
Minister Stanley Baldwin, British Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston 
Churchill, commission chairman Judge Richard Feetham and Northern 
Ireland boundary commission representative J.R. Fisher to agree to the 
suppression of the Boundary Commission’s report, and the abrogation 
of Article 12 of the Treaty which provided for the establishment of a 
Council of Ireland. This made permanent the partition of the island 
of Ireland as defined by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920. This 
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arrangement had the effect of rendering nugatory Articles 13, 14 and 15 
of the Treaty. In accepting the status quo, Cosgrave pledged ‘neighbourly 
comradeship with Craig’s Government’.67 The terms of the Tripartite 
Agreement concluded between the governments of the Free State, Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland on 3 December 1925 were unanimously 
approved by the British houses of parliament and, following a vote, in 
the Dáil and the Seanad.68 
Article 13:
For the purpose of the last foregoing article, the powers of the Parliament 
of Southern Ireland under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, to 
elect members of the Council of Ireland shall after the Parliament of 
the Irish Free State is constituted be exercised by that Parliament.
The provisions of this article were contingent upon the provisions of 
Article 12. The Council of Ireland as captured by Article 12 was never 
convened. This was due to the Tripartite Agreement of 1925 (see above), 
which set aside the provision of Article 12 which mandated the convening 
of a Council of Ireland.
Article 14:
After the expiration of the said month, if no such address as is mentioned 
in Article 12 hereof is presented, the Parliament and Government 
of Northern Ireland shall continue to exercise as respects Northern 
Ireland the powers conferred on them by the Government of Ireland 
Act, 1920, but the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State 
shall in Northern Ireland have in relation to matters in respect of which 
the Parliament of Northern Ireland has not power to make laws under 
that Act (including matters which under the said Act are within the 
jurisdiction of the Council of Ireland) the same powers as in the rest 
of Ireland subject to such other provisions as may be agreed in manner 
hereinafter appearing.
As an address was presented to King George V by both houses of the 
Northern Ireland parliament, the link between Northern Ireland and the 
Free State as provided for in Article 12 was nullified.69 The Council of 
Ireland provision was nullified by the Tripartite Agreement of 1925 (see 
 An Historical and Legal Interpretation 263
above), which maintained the scope of the existing border, as defined in 
the Government of Ireland Act, 1920. 
Article 15:
At any time after the date hereof the Government of Northern Ireland 
and the provisional Government of Southern Ireland hereinafter 
constituted may meet for the purpose of discussing the provisions 
subject to which the last foregoing article is to operate in the event of 
no such address as is therein mentioned being presented, and those 
provisions may include:—
(a) Safeguards with regard to patronage in Northern Ireland;
(b) Safeguards with regard to the collection of revenue in Northern 
Ireland;
(c) Safeguards with regard to import and export duties affecting the 
trade or industry of Northern Ireland;
(d) Safeguards for minorities in Northern Ireland;
(e) The settlement of the financial relations between Northern Ireland 
and the Irish Free State.
(f) The establishment and powers of a local militia in Northern 
Ireland and the relation of the Defence Forces of the Irish Free 
State and of Northern Ireland respectively;
and if at any such meeting provisions are agreed to, the same shall have 
effect as if they were included amongst the provisions subject to which 
the Powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State 
are to be exercisable in Northern Ireland under Article 14 hereof.
Due to the address to King George V and the Tripartite Agreement of 
1925 (see above), the provisions of Article 15 were never implemented.
Article 16:
Neither the Parliament of the Irish Free State nor the Parliament of 
Northern Ireland shall make any law so as either directly or indirectly 
to endow any religion or prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof 
or give any preference or impose any disability on account of religious 
belief or religious status or affect prejudicially the right of any child 
to attend a school receiving public money without attending the 
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religious instruction at the school or make any discrimination as 
respects state aid between schools under the management of different 
religious denominations or divert from any religious denomination or 
any educational institution any of its property except for public utility 
purposes and on payment of compensation.
This provision is very similar to earlier provisions which had been 
contained in the various home rule bills and the Government of Ireland 
Act, 1920. However, those earlier enactments had contained a prohibition 
on the ‘establishment’ of any religion whereas this clause simply prohibits 
its ‘endowment’. Furthermore, the earlier enactments had also placed a 
prohibition on making any religious belief or ceremony a condition of 
a valid marriage but this is not dealt with here. This omission led to 
controversy in the House of Commons during debates on the issue. 
Earlier provisions had also prevented an Irish parliament from interfering 
with the constitution of a religious body without the approval of its 
governing body. Another important distinction between this provision 
and earlier versions is that this article adds the important prohibition of 
discrimination in respect of educational bodies and grants to schools.
The prohibition on the diversion of religious property except for 
public utility purposes and the requirement of compensation had been 
included in the earlier legislation and was significant given that the Irish 
Free State Constitution drawn up later did not contain a right to private 
property. This article was followed up by Article 8 in the Irish Free State 
Constitution which provided: 
Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion 
are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen, 
and no law may be made either directly or indirectly to endow any 
religion, or prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof or give any 
preference, or impose any disability on account of religious belief or 
religious status, or affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend 
a school receiving public money without attending the religious 
instruction at the school, or make any discrimination as respects State 
aid between schools under the management of different religious 
denominations, or divert from any religious denomination or any 
educational institution any of its property except for the purpose of 
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roads, railways, lighting, water or drainage works or other works of 
public utility, and on payment of compensation.
Article 17:
By way of provisional arrangement for the administration of 
Southern Ireland during the interval which must elapse between the 
date hereof and the constitution of a Parliament and Government 
of the Irish Free State in accordance therewith, steps shall be taken 
forthwith for summoning a meeting of members of Parliament 
elected for constituencies in Southern Ireland since the passing of the 
Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and for constituting a provisional 
Government, and the British Government shall take the steps 
necessary to transfer to such provisional Government the powers 
and machinery requisite for the discharge of its duties, provided 
that every member of such provisional Government shall have 
signified in writing his or her acceptance of this instrument. But this 
arrangement shall not continue in force beyond the expiration of 
twelve months from the date hereof.
On 14 January 1922, a meeting of the members elected to the House of 
Commons of Southern Ireland (largely correspondent with the Second 
Dáil) took place at the Mansion House, Dublin, in order to approve the 
Treaty and a Provisional Government was elected under the chairmanship 
of Michael Collins. The Provisional Government took up office two days 
later on 16 January 1922 and became the de facto government as Dublin 
Castle, the centre of British administration in Ireland, was handed over. 
The Westminster parliament had not yet formally appointed the new Irish 
ministers or conferred the government with any powers. Thus, it was still a 
‘provisional’ government, from the British perspective at least. This power 
was conferred following the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922, which 
was passed on 31 March 1922.70 This Act gave the force of law to certain 
provisions of the Treaty and, in relation to Article 17 in particular, it provided 
that the British government could, by orders in council, transfer powers to 
the Provisional Government of Southern Ireland, that the Parliament of 
Southern Ireland would be dissolved within four months from the passing 
of the Act, and that elections would be held for ‘the House of the Parliament’ 
to which the Provisional Government would be responsible.
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On 1 April 1922, an order in council was then passed, entitled the 
Provisional Government (Transfer of Functions) Order, 1922, which in 
pursuance to this article of the Treaty, transferred the administration 
of public services in Southern Ireland from existing government 
departments and officers to the departments and officers of the Provisional 
Government. This order transferred the full authority of the state within 
Southern Ireland to the Provisional Government, including all the laws 
that applied to Southern Ireland when under British rule. The ministerial 
appointments became official and were announced in Iris Oifigiúil, the 
new gazetteer of the Irish government, on 4 April 1922.
Article 18:
This instrument shall be submitted forthwith by His Majesty’s 
Government for the approval of Parliament and by the Irish signatories 
to a meeting summoned for the purpose of the members elected to sit in 
the House of Commons of Southern Ireland, and if approved shall be 
ratified by the necessary legislation.
The ratification of the Treaty is something which has caused quite a bit of 
confusion. In international law, ratification may take different forms but 
because this instrument specified the particular method of its ratification, 
then this was the only method by which it could be validly ratified. 
However, when writing about the debates in the Dáil of January 1922, 
during which the Treaty was approved, some commentators refer to the 
approval as formal ratification.71 Similarly, the approval of the British 
parliament in December 1921 has been mistaken for ratification.
In late January 1922, a question was put to Michael Collins by one 
of the members of the Constitution Committee as to whether the Treaty 
would be ratified before the Constitution was finished.72 D.H. Akenson 
and F.P. Fallin have written that this question of ratification ‘so disturbed 
Collins that he and Hugh Kennedy soon left for London to press for the 
Treaty’s immediate ratification’.73 The writers maintain that Lloyd George 
eventually agreed to Collins’s demand, on the understanding that the 
draft Constitution would be shown to the British cabinet before being 
published. They claim that Lloyd George kept his bargain and that the 
Treaty was ratified by the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act on 31 March 
1922.74 
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However, another confusion seems to have arisen here in that 
section 1(5) of that Act specified that it was not the act for ratification 
of the Treaty. This was due, for the most part, to the fact that the ‘Ulster 
month’ (the period during which Northern Ireland could opt out of Irish 
independence as provided for in the Treaty) would begin on formal 
ratification, so instead it was decided that formal ratification would 
occur when the Constitution was being promulgated and the month 
could run from then. Instead, the purpose of this Act was to fulfil the 
Treaty obligations in relation to the formal handing over of power to the 
Provisional Government under Article 17. Formal ratification was thus 
completed by the British in December in the Irish Free State (Constitution) 
Act, 1922, to which the Constitution forms a schedule.75 On the Irish 
side, the Treaty was ratified by the Irish Free State Constitution Act in 
the same month.76 By this Act, the Treaty was also made part of Irish law 
because of the incorporation of the Treaty into the constitution.77
In summary, therefore, the Treaty essentially provided for the 
following points:
1. Ireland was to become a self-governing dominion, like Canada 
2. The British Crown would be head of state and would be represented 
by a governor general figure
3. Members of the Irish parliament would have to swear an oath of 
allegiance (to the Constitution – and faithfulness to the king)
4. The Irish Free State would assume some responsibility for the payment 
of the Imperial debt
5. For its own security, Britain would retain the Treaty ports and the size 
of the Irish army would be limited
6. Northern Ireland would have the option of remaining within or 
separating from the Irish Free State and arrangements were made for 
both possibilities 
In reality, the document seems too pithy and lacks the detail one would 
imagine would be required for an agreement which sets out the new 
status of a country. It is evident, therefore, that the provisions were simply 
the main points of an otherwise oral understanding.78 For example, it is 
never actually provided for in the Treaty that the Irish Free State would 
draft its own Constitution, which would govern and set out the actual 
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constitutional position of the state. But, of course, it was understood by 
both sides that this would happen. The only place the Constitution is 
mentioned in the Treaty is, in fact, in the oath. Neither is it expounded in 
the Treaty that any Constitution would be inferior to the Treaty itself or 
that were any conflict to arise, the Treaty would be held to be supreme. 
However, it was evidently always understood by both sides that the Treaty 
would, in fact, be superior to the Constitution and that the Constitution 
would set out the law along the lines of what had been agreed in the 
Treaty.79 
imperial conferences (1923 and 1930) and  
Their implications for the stability of the  
anglo-irish Treaty 
Two Imperial conferences, one in October and November 1926, the other 
in 1930, had particular significance for the status of the Irish Free State as 
a distinct dominion comparable to Australia, New Zealand, Canada and 
South Africa. 
The Imperial Conference of 1926 brought together the South Africans 
and Irish in a joint endeavour to define the future of the Commonwealth 
and ‘in so doing to place beyond argument the freedom and equality 
of the dominions’.80 There was strong pressure from both delegations 
to devise a formula adequately descriptive of the Commonwealth as it 
was in 1926. What emerged was, as F.S.L. Lyons puts it, ‘one of the great 
landmarks in the Constitutional history of the empire’, as Great Britain 
and the dominions were defined as: ‘autonomous Communities within 
the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another 
in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united in a 
common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of 
the British Commonwealth of Nations’. 81
The 1930 Imperial Conference, in which the Irish delegation led by 
Minister for External Affairs Patrick McGilligan played a leading part, 
reached its climax in the Statute of Westminster, which received the 
royal assent on 11 December 1931. The statute implemented a resolution 
taken in 1930 at the Imperial Conference. The Statute of Westminster 
laid down that the British parliament could no longer legislate for any 
of the dominions, and that dominions could repeal or amend any Act 
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of the British parliament that affected them. The statute also provided 
that no law made by the parliament of a dominion should be void and 
inoperative on the grounds that it was repugnant to the law of England. 
The parliament of a dominion was granted the full power to make laws 
having extra-territorial operation. Significantly for the Free State, the 
statute provided that no future Act of the British parliament should 
extend to a dominion unless it was expressly declared in that Act that 
the dominion had requested it and consented to its enactment. This was 
interpreted by Winston Churchill, who was, at this stage, a Conservative 
backbencher, as meaning that it would allow the Free State to repudiate 
the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Churchill argued that the Irish Free 
State should be excluded from any provision of the Statute of Westminster 
that might allow it to evade or repudiate the terms of the Treaty. W.T. 
Cosgrave believed firmly that the statute was subordinate to the Anglo-
Irish Treaty, that the Treaty could be altered only by consent and that the 
Irish government viewed it with ‘solemnity’.82 However, shortly after the 
Statute of Westminster took effect, Cosgrave’s administration was replaced 
by a Fianna Fáil one led by de Valera, who welcomed the outcomes of 
the 1926 and 1930 Imperial conferences as facilitating his scheme for 
dismantling the Anglo-Irish Treaty. 
De Valera was barely in office when he began his campaign to 
dismantle the Treaty. His first move was to remove the oath to be taken 
by members of the Free State parliament. This was the oath prescribed in 
Article 4 of the Treaty. A second component of de Valera’s campaign was 
to suspend land annuity payments to the British exchequer. In May 1933, 
the Removal of Oath Bill became law. 
A further major attack on the Treaty involved taking the Crown out 
of the Constitution by diminishing the powers of the governor general, 
the Crown’s representative. In 1932, the holder of that office, James 
McNeill, was dismissed or allowed to resign. His successor, Domhnall 
Ua Buachalla, a country shopkeeper, was installed, not in the Viceregal 
Lodge but in a suburban house, his main responsibility being to sign acts 
of parliament. The British government, in common with W.T. Cosgrave, 
challenged de Valera’s right to dismantle the terms of the Treaty without 
British agreement. However, in 1935, the British Privy Council, in its 
judgment in Moore v Attorney General, settled the issue, making it clear 
that before 1931 the Irish Free State parliament had not been competent 
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to abrogate the Treaty but as a consequence of the Statute of Westminster, 
it had acquired the necessary power to do so. The substance of the 
decision of the Privy Council was summarised: ‘The simplest way of 
stating the situation is to say that the Statute of Westminster gave to the 
Irish Free State a power under which they could abrogate the Treaty, and 
that, as a matter of law, they have availed themselves of that power’.83 In 
this way, the Privy Council confirmed its own abolition with respect to 
the Irish Free State with respect to all other constitutional amendments 
aimed at dismantling the settlement imposed by the Anglo-Irish Treaty. 
The process of dismantling the Treaty culminated in the passage of a new 
Constitution in 1937. The Constitution of Ireland/Bunreacht na hÉireann 
made the articles of the Anglo-Irish Treaty irrelevant. 
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